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ABSTRACT 
Communication networks have become a fundamental part of many critical infrastructures, playing an 
important role in information delivery in various failure scenarios triggered e.g., by forces of nature (including 
earthquakes, tornados, fires, etc.), technology-related disasters (for instance due to power blackout), or malicious 
human activities. A number of recovery schemes have been defined in the context of network resilience (with the 
primary focus on communication possibility in failure scenarios including access to a particular host, or 
information exchange between a certain pair of end nodes). However, because end-users are becoming more and 
more interested in information itself (regardless of its physical location in the network), it is appropriate to 
complement the well-defined framework of network resilience with one that addresses information resilience, 
and to introduce definitions of relevant disciplines and measures, as proposed in this paper.  
 
Keywords: information resilience, survivability, disruption tolerance, dependability; communication networks, 
information-centric networking, metrics, failures 
 
1.  Introduction 
Due to the convergence of telecommunications, media, and information technology accompanied by a rapid 
growth of traffic volume carried across communication networks, a transition of communication interest can be 
observed from host-based towards information-based [1]-[2]. Indeed, users now simply look for information 
(rather than for access to a particular host) regardless of its physical location. In the literature such a concept, in 
which the task to determine the location of information and deliver it to the user is left to the network, is referred 
to as information-centric networking (ICN), or content-centric networking (CCN) [1], [2]. ICN architectures 
commonly make use of anycasting ‒ a transmission scheme able to deliver information to a requesting unit from 
one out of many possible locations – and pub/sub (publish/subscribe) message/information exchange [1], [2].  
As the performance of communication networks frequently suffers from a number of disruptive events, 
various techniques based on utilization of alternate communication paths have been introduced to maintain the 
possibility of transmission in the case of failures of single or multiple network nodes and links. These backup 
paths can be either established dynamically after a failure (known as the reactive restoration approach [2]) or set 
up in advance (referred to as the pre-planned protection scheme [2]). The objective of these mechanisms is to 
assure the network resilience defined in [3] as the ability of a network to provide and maintain an acceptable 
level of service in the face of various faults and challenges to normal operation.  
A detailed classification of network resilience disciplines expanding beyond dependability on those 
introduced by Avizienis et al. in [4] is presented in [3] by Sterbenz et al. As shown in Fig. 1, it includes six 
major disciplines, namely: survivability, traffic tolerance, disruption tolerance, dependability, security and 
performability. However, this classification was originally introduced primarily for the network resilience 
context. As there is currently no classification available in the literature aimed to define the related disciplines 
and measures of information resilience, the aim of this paper is to fill the gap by proposing a refinement of the 





























Fig. 1 Classification of network resilience disciplines from [3]. 
In the remainder of this paper, a definition of information resilience is first introduced in Section 2 and is 
followed by a discussion on its relation to the network resilience paradigm. Section 3, in turn, proposes 
definitions of relevant disciplines and measures of information resilience. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Information Resilience vs. Network Resilience 
The observed shift of end-user communication interest towards information-oriented networking increases 
the importance of ICN solutions in the context of emerging architectures of communication networks               
(in particular of the Future Internet). Additionally, the use for example of anycasting enabling retrieval of 
information from several sources of replicated content can provide a kind of a natural resilience at practically no 
extra cost. This is also true in the case of failure of a node being the source of information (as shown in Fig. 2), 
which is not possible for the common unicast transmission. However, some overhead in the context of 



















Fig. 2 Example illustrations of: (a) anycast communications providing resilience also in the context of a failure of a node 
hosting the information and (b) conventional unicast scheme not able to provide protection against a failure of the end node 
of a communication path (even if alternate paths are installed). 
 
Any information-related recovery scheme should be also resistant to scenarios of failures of alternate sources 
of information, so we define information resilience as the ability of a network to provide users with continued 
access to information in the face of various faults and challenges to normal operation. Since ICN solutions are 
meant to coexist with the common network recovery mechanisms applied for host-based communications [1], 
information resilience is in fact an extension of (not replacing) the network resilience model and mechanisms. 
An efficient scheme of information resilience is crucial in the context of disaster scenarios when massive 
disruptions not only affect the performance of a network (e.g., as a result of multiple correlated failures), but also 
(and often primarily) have a long-lasting negative impact on the quality of a human life [5]–[7]. A wide range of 
these events follow from the occurrence of earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, tsunamis, power 
blackouts, or human-induced failures (including acts of terrorism or other malicious activities aimed to cause 
maximum degradation of the network performance or to make critical information non-accessible). Particularly 
in the context of these events, a common expectation is that the global communication infrastructure would still 
remain operational and allow people to exchange information with relatives and colleagues, as well as to enable 
receiving of information disseminated from legal authorities to citizens in a timely manner. From the user 
perspective, information itself is of course one of the most desired assets, regardless of its physical location in 
the network (as long as its source can be trusted).  
The majority of disaster scenarios also imply a significant increase in traffic volume to be transmitted over 
the communication network (in particular in areas affected by a disaster). At the same time, in the case of 
network partitions after massive failures, network infrastructure may be only partially available, which in turn 
implies serious concerns related with information availability [8]. Since post-disaster degradation of a network 
performance is evident, in the early stage of a network design (and then later during further evolution of the 
network architecture) it is vital to assure a number of information resilience properties ‒ many of which need 
definitions and related measures, as proposed in the next section of this paper. 
 
3.  Disciplines and Measures of Information Resilience 
Similar to the network resilience concept from [3], classification of disciplines in information resilience can 
be based on challenge tolerance and trustworthiness categories. However, concerning information-oriented 
communications, we propose to assume that:  
− challenge tolerance disciplines are related with the network design issues to provide undisturbed access 
to information in the face of challenges,  
− trustworthiness disciplines aim to define the measurable characteristics of information resilience.  
Robustness, the control theoretic notion to the measurable response of a perturbed system, denoting the 
relation between challenge tolerance and trustworthiness (see Fig. 1), should be viewed as an indicator of             
a network’s ability to deliver information successfully when challenged.  
For information resilience, a refinement of definitions of challenge tolerance disciplines is needed as follows: 
− survivability should be defined as the ability of a system to deliver relevant information to the user in    
a timely manner in the presence of challenges resulting in multiple correlated failures, typically in the 
form of a coordinated attack or large-scale disaster. The word “mission” from the original definition of 
survivability from [3] in this context means assuring information availability and delivery to the user, 
− fault tolerance should mean the ability of a communication system to provide the user with relevant 
information in spite of faults resulting from events other than service failures. As noted in [3], fault 
tolerance here also does not cover the case of multiple failures, 
− disruption tolerance, originally denoting the ability of a system to tolerate disconnections of its 
components (due to weak or intermittent connectivity, mobility, unpredictably long delay, and energy 
constraints) [3], should now refer to the ability of a communication system to deliver relevant 
information to the user despite disconnections or failures of system components and information 
repositories during and after disruptions, 
− traffic tolerance should refer to the ability of a communication network to serve the increased traffic 
during and after challenges. This includes increased requests related with information retrieval, as well 
as any other information exchange such as telepresence and BitTorrent. Such a definition is justifiable 
since compared to the traffic tolerance concept given in [3] for the network resilience, information 
resilience puts a special focus on the ability of a network to accommodate the increased traffic volume 
as a consequence of legitimate user attempts to retrieve and exchange information (i.e., post-disaster 
activities of users).  
Trustworthiness originally defined in the literature as “the assurance that the communication system will 
perform as expected” [4] should be redefined for information resilience to denote the assurance that the 
communication system will enable the user to access and exchange the relevant information regardless of the 
failure scenario. Trustworthiness includes three disciplines, namely: dependability, security, and 
performability.  
In particular, the original definition of dependability from [4] should be refined to quantify the service 
reliance in the context of information accessibility and retrieval. In other words, for information resilience it can 
be defined as the ability to deliver or exchange information.  
Measures of dependability are defined in our paper as follows: 
− reliability (R) measuring the continuity of information accessibility, being the probability that the 
information remains accessible for a user regardless of the physical location of information in the 
network in time frame (0, t), as given by:  R(t) = Pr(information is accessible in [0, t]),  
− availability determining the readiness of a network to deliver or exchange information, being the 
probability that information can be exchanged at a given time, 
The importance of information availability vs. information reliability depends on whether 
information access is important (such as with an HTTP transaction or CDN push), or an information 
exchange session is important (as explained in [2]), 
− maintainability, originally defined as a predisposition of a system to updates (or evolution) measured 
with respect to downtime [4], should now denote the ability of a network to maintain information 
during periods of system updates/evolution, 
− safety denotes that the unavailability of information will not lead to catastrophic consequences, in 
particular severe injury or loss of human or animal life, or catastrophic consequences to the 
environment, 
− integrity should define the assurance that retrieved information has neither been tampered with nor 
damaged through any activity/system error since the previous authorised access to information. 
We define information security as the ability of a communication system to defend itself from unauthorised 
access to/update of information. Following [3], information security can be further characterised in terms of 
availability and integrity (also characterising dependability), as well as concerning its own properties listed in [3] 
refined in this paper in the context of information resilience as follows: 
− confidentiality is the assurance that regardless of the failure scenario, information is made available 
only to authorised individuals, 
− non-repudiability is the possibility to guarantee the integrity and availability of the identity of              
a sender/receiver of the information regardless of the failure scenario, 
− auditability is the information security assessment possible regardless of the failure scenario, 
− authorisability is an approval granted to an entity (system/user) to access information, 
− authenticity is the confirmed truthfulness of a piece of information claimed true by an entity. 
 
Performability was originally defined as the level of performance defined in terms of QoS measures 
including delay, jitter, throughput/goodput and packet delivery ratio [4]; with respect to dependability, 
performability considers degraded performance of a complex system rather than a component being operational 
or failed. In the context of information resilience, performability can be specified as the ability of a network to 
deliver the required QoS performance in the context of information exchange regardless of the failure scenario. 
As network performance under massive failures will be reduced, it is hardly possible that QoS characteristics 
could be kept unchanged. Therefore, for any failure scenario it is reasonable to expect that performability will be 
either full or degraded (compared with the expected QoS performance in a normal operational state). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The observed shift of user activities in communication networks towards information exchange has 
motivated network operators to apply architecture focused on content delivery and replication, including caches 
and CDNs. Because the need to exchange relevant and up-to-date information is naturally magnified in scenarios 
of massive failures, it is important not only to deploy the respective mechanisms to improve the performance of 
communication networks under disruptions, but also to be able to measure the performance of a network in terms 
of information accessibility and delivery. To fill in the gap related with missing disciplines and measures of 
information resilience in the literature, in this paper we have proposed the refinement of the original 
classification from [3] by adapting it to the context of information-centric networking. 
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